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11 Introduction
Gender inequality is a major problem for development. First, the affected women are
deprived of their basic freedoms (Sen, 1999). Second, going beyond this intrinsic feature
of gender inequality, it implies high costs for society in the form of lower human capital,
worse governance, and lower growth (e.g. World Bank, 2001; Klasen, 2002). Although
the intrinsic and instrumental value of gender equality is known and set as a goal on the
development agenda (e.g., Millennium Development Goal 3 “Promote gender equality
and empower women”), gender inequality remains a pervasive phenomenon.
To measure the extent of this problem at the cross-country level several gender-related
indices have been proposed, e.g. the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) and
the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) (United Nations Development Programme,
1995), the Global Gender Gap Index from the World EconomicForum (Lopez-Claros and
Zahidi, 2005), the Gender Equity Index developed by Social Watch (2005) or the African
Gender Status Index proposed by the Economic Commission for Africa (2004). These
measures focus on gender inequality in well-being or in agency and they are typically
outcome-focused (Klasen, 2006, 2007).
Focusing only on outcomes neglects the question of where gender inequality comes
from. Gender inequality is mainly the result of human behavior. How people behave and
interact is inﬂuenced by institutions. From an economics perspective, institutionsare con-
ceived as the result of collective choices in a society to achieve efﬁciency, solve collective
action dilemmas and reduce transaction costs (e.g. North, 1990). Other social sciences
emphasize legitimacy and appropriateness instead of efﬁciency. Institutions inﬂuence the
preferences of actors and provide role models that are internalized by them (Hall and
Taylor, 1996; De Soysa and Jütting, 2007).
There is a particular type of institutions that is relevant for gender inequality, social
institutions related to gender inequality. Social institutions related to gender inequality
are long-lasting norms, values and codes of conduct that ﬁnd expression in traditions, cus-
toms and cultural practices, informal and formal laws. They inﬂuence human behavior as
they frame gender-relevant meanings, form the basis of gender roles and become guiding
principlesin everydaylife. Inﬂuencing thedistributionofpowerbetween men and women
in the private sphere of the family, in the economic sphere, and in public life, they con-
strain the opportunities of men and women and their capabilities to live the life they value
(Sen, 1999). Accounting for these social institutions is necessary to understand outcome
gender inequality and the deprivation women experience. Additionally, neglecting them
implies neglecting a major factor that might be related to development.
2There are three measures that from a human rights perspective deal with the question
of how women are treated in society: the Women’s Political Rights index (WOPOL),
the Women’s Economic Rights index (WECON), and the Women’s Social Rights index
(WOSOC) of the CIRI Human Rights Data Project.1 These indices measure on a yearly
basiswhetheranumberofinternationallyrecognized rightsforwomenareincludedinlaw
and whether government enforces them. They proxy somehow the type of institutions
we are concerned about, but also cover outcomes of these institutions. From the three
indices, WOSOC is the most encompassingmeasure covering social relations (Bjornskov,
Dreher, and Fischer, 2009). However, it does not allow to differentiate between different
dimensionsof social institutions. Forexample, it is importantto distinguishbetween what
happens within the family and what happens in public and social life. Furthermore, all
three indices can only take four values from 0 (no rights) to 3 (legally guaranteed and
enforced rights) which makes it difﬁcult to compare and rank countries as there are many
ties in the data.
This paper centers on the measurement of social institutions related to gender inequal-
ity. We propose new composite measures that proxy social institutions related to gen-
der inequality in non-OECD countries based on variables of the OECD Gender, Institu-
tions and Development database (Morrison and Jütting, 2005; Jütting, Morrison, Dayton-
Johnson, and Drechsler, 2008). We aggregate the variables into ﬁve subindices that mea-
sure each one dimension of social institutions related to gender inequality (Family code,
Civil liberties, Physical integrity, Son preference and Ownership rights). We combine
the subindices into the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) as a multidimensional
measure of deprivation of women.
In general, the construction of composite measures requires several decisions, for ex-
ample about the weighting scheme and the method of aggregation (e.g. Nardo, Saisana,
Saltelli, Tarantola, Hoffman, and Giovannini, 2005). The subindices as one-dimensional
measures are built using the method of polychoric PCA to extract the common informa-
tion of the variables corresponding to a subindex. When we combine the subindices to
construct the SIGI, we use a reasonable methodology to capture the multidimensional de-
privation of women caused by social institutions. The formula of the SIGI is inspired by
the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984) and
offers a new way of aggregating gender inequality in several dimensions measured by the
subindices. It is transparent and easy to understand, it penalizes high inequality in each
dimension and allows only for partial compensation between dimensions.
The SIGI and thesubindicesare useful toolsto comparethe societalsituationof women
1 Information is available on the webpage of the project http://ciri.binghamton.edu/.
3in over 100 non-OECD countries from a new perspective, allowing the identiﬁcation of
problematic countries and dimensions of social institutions that deserve attention by pol-
icy makers and need to be scrutinized in detail. Empirical results show that the SIGI
providesadditionalinformationto that of otherwell-knowngender-related indices. More-
over, regression analysis shows that the SIGI is related to indices that measure outcome
gender inequality, even if one controls for region, religion and level of economic devel-
opment.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe theOECD Gender, Institu-
tions and Development Database. Then, in sections 3 and 4 we focus on the construction
of the subindices and of the SIGI. In section 5, we present empirical results by country,
interesting regional patterns and a comparison between the SIGI and other gender-related
measures. Furthermore, using regression analysis we illustrate the relevance of the SIGI
for explaining outcome gender inequality. The last section concludes with a discussion of
the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed measures.
2 The OECD Gender, Institutions and Development
Database
As input for the composite measures we use variables from the OECD Gender, Institu-
tions and Development Database (Morrison and Jütting, 2005; Jütting et al., 2008). This
is a cross-country database covering about 120 countries with more than 20 variables
measuring social institutions related to gender inequality.2 These variables proxy social
institutions through prevalence rates, legal indicators or indicators of social practices. We
assume that the concept social institutions related to gender inequality is multidimen-
sional. Following previous work done by the OECD (Jütting et al., 2008) we choose
twelve variables that are assumed to measure each one of four dimensions of social insti-
tutions.
The Family code dimension refers to the private sphere with institutions that inﬂuence
the decision-making power of women in the household. Family code is measured by the
following four variables. Parental authority measures whether women have the right to
be the legal guardian of a child during marriage, and whether women have custody rights
over a child after divorce. Inheritance is based on formal inheritance rights of spouses.
Early marriage measures the percentage of girls between 15 and 19 years of age who
2 The data are available at the web-pages http://www.wikigender.org and
http://www.oecd.org/dev/gender/gid.
4are/were ever married. Polygamy measures the acceptance of polygamy in the population.
Countries where this information is not available are assigned scores based on the legality
of polygamy.3
The public sphere is measured by the Civil liberties dimension that captures the free-
dom of social participation of women and includes the following two variables. Freedom
of movement indicates the freedom of women to move outside the home. Freedom of
dress is based on the obligation of women to use a veil or burqa to cover parts of their
body in public.
The Physical integrity dimension comprises different indicators on violence against
women. The variable violence against women indicates the existence of laws against
domestic violence, sexual assault or rape, and sexual harassment. Female genital mutila-
tion is the percentage of women who have undergone female genital mutilation. Missing
women measures gender bias in mortality. Countries were coded based on estimates of
gender bias in mortality for a sample of countries (Klasen and Wink, 2003) and on sex
ratios of young people and adults.
The Ownership rights dimension covers the economic sphere of social institutions
proxied by the access of women to several types of property. Women’s access to land
indicates whether women are allowed to own land. Women’s access to bank loans mea-
sures whether women are allowed to access credits. Women’s access to property other
than land covers mainly access to real property such as houses, but also any other prop-
erty.
Concerning the missing women variable in the Physical integrity dimension, it could
be argued that it reﬂects another dimension of gender inequality. Missing women is an
extreme manifestation of son preference under scarce resources. 100 million women are
not alivewho should be aliveif women were not discriminated against (Sen, 1992; Klasen
and Wink, 2003). The other components of Physical integrity, violence against women
and female genital mutilation, measure particularly the treatment of women which is not
only motivated by economic considerations. In the next section, we check with statistical
methods if missing women measures another dimension as the variables violence against
women and female genital mutilation.
These twelve variables are between 0 and 1. The value 0 means no or very low in-
equality and the value 1 indicates high inequality. Three of the variables (early marriage,
female genital mutilation and violence against women) are continuous. The other indi-
3 Acceptance of polygamy in the population might proxy actual practices better than the formal indicator
legality of polygamy and, moreover, laws might be changed faster than practices. Therefore, the ac-
ceptance variable is the ﬁrst choice for the subindex Family code. The reason for using legality when
acceptance is missing is to increase the number of countries.
5cators measure social institutions on an ordinal categorical scale. The chosen variables
cover around 120 non-OECD countries from all regions in the world except North Amer-
ica.4 The choice of the variables is also guided by the availability of information so that
as many countries as possiblecan be ranked by the SIGI. Within our sample 102 countries
have information for all twelve variables.
3 Construction of the Subindices
The objective of the subindices is to provide a summary measure for each dimension of
social institutions related to gender inequality. In every subindex we want to combine
variables that are assumed to belong to one dimension. The ﬁrst step is to check the
statistical association between the variables. The second step consists in aggregating the
variables with a reasonable weighting scheme.
3.1 Measuring the Association between Categorical Variables
To check the association between variables, and as most of them are ordinal, we use
Kendall Tau b and Multiple Joint Correspondence Analysis (Greenacre, 2007; Nenadi´ c,
2007).
Kendall Tau b is a rank correlation coefﬁcient. These measures are useful when the
data are ordinal and thus the conditions for using Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcient are not











where C is the number of concordant pairs, D is the number of discordant pairs, n is the
number of observations,
n(n−1)
2 is the number of all pairs, Tx is the number of pairs tied on
4 The OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database does not contain variables that capture rele-
vant social institutions related to gender inequality in OECD countries.
5 For calculating Kendall Tau, one counts the number of concordant and discordant pairs of two rankings,
builds the difference and divides this difference by the total number of pairs. A value of 1 means total
correspondence of rankings, i.e. the rankings are the same. A value of -1 indicates reverse rankings or
a negative association between rankings. A value of 0 means independence of rankings. Kendall Tau b
is a variant of Kendall tau that corrects for ties, which are frequent in the case of discrete data (Agresti,
1984, chap. 9). We consider Kendall Tau b to be the appropriate measure of rank correlation to ﬁnd out
whether our data are related.
6the variable x and Ty is the number of pairs tied on the variable y. The notation is taken
from Agresti (1984).
As a second method to check the association between variables we examine the graph-
ics produced by Multiple Joint Correspondence Analysis (MJCA) (Greenacre, 2007; Ne-
nadi´ c, 2007), after having discretized the three continuous variables. Correspondence
Analysis is a method for analyzing and representing the structure of contingency tables
graphically. We use MJCA to ﬁnd out whether variables seem to measure the same.6
The results for Kendall tau b (Tables 1- 5) are reported in Appendix 1. A signiﬁcant
positive value of Kendall tau b is a sign for a positive association between two variables.
This is the case for all variables belonging to one dimension, except missing women in the
subindexPhysicalintegrity. ThegraphsproducedwithMJCAareavailableuponrequest.7
The results of MJCA also conﬁrm that within every dimension all the variables seem to
measure the same dimension, with the exception of missing women in the dimension
Physical integrity. These results support the argumentation in section 2.
We decide to use the variable missing women as a ﬁfth subindex called Son preference.
The artiﬁcially higher female mortality is one of the most important and cruel aspects of
gender inequality and should not be neglected, as over 100 million women that should be
alive are missing (Sen, 1992; Klasen and Wink, 2003). Missing women is the “starkest
manifestation of the lack of gender equality” (Duﬂo, 2005).
3.2 Aggregating Variables to Build a Subindex
The ﬁve subindices Family code, Civil liberties, Son preference, Physical integrity and
Ownership rights use the twelve variables as input that were mentioned in the previous
section. Each subindex combines variables that measure one dimension of social institu-
tions related to gender inequality. In the case of Son preference, the subindex takes the
6 CorrespondenceAnalysisis anexploratoryanddescriptivemethodtoanalyzecontingencytables. Instead
of calculating a correlation coefﬁcient to capture the association of variables, the correspondence of
conditional and marginal distributions of either rows or columns - also called row or column proﬁles - is
measuredusing a c2-statistic, thatcaptures thedistance betweenthem. These rowor columnproﬁlesthen
are plotted in a low-dimensional space, so that the distances between the points reﬂect the dissimilarities
between the proﬁles. Multiple Joint Correspondence Analysis is an extended procedure for the analysis
of more than two variables and considers the cross-tabulations of the variables against each other in a so-
called Burt matrix but with modiﬁed diagonal sub-tables. This facilitates to ﬁgure out whether variables
are associated. This is the case when they have similar deviations from homogeneity, and therefore get a
similar position in a proﬁle space (Greenacre, 2007; Nenadi´ c, 2007).
7 The graphs produced with MJCA can be interpreted in the following way. In most cases, one of the
axes represents whether there is inequality and the other axe represents the extent of inequality. If one
connects the values of a variable one obtains a graphical pattern. If this is similar to the pattern obtained
for another variable, then both variables are associated.
7value of the variable missing women. In all other cases, the computation of the subindex
values involves two steps.
In the ﬁrst step, the method of polychoric principal component analysis is used to ex-
tract the common information of the variables corresponding to a subindex. Principal
component analysis (PCA) is a method of dimensionality reduction that is valid for nor-
mally distributed variables (Jolliffe, 1986). This assumption is violated in this case, as
the data include variables that are ordinal, and hence the Pearson correlation coefﬁcient is
not appropriate. Following Kolenikov and Angeles (2004, 2009) we use polychoric PCA,
which relies on polychoric and polyserial correlations. These are estimated with maxi-
mum likelihood, assuming that there are latent normally distributed variables that underly
the ordinal categorical data. We use the First Principal Component (FPC) as a proxy
for the common information contained by the variables corresponding to the subindices,
measuring each one of the dimensions of social institutions related to gender inequality.
The ﬁrst principal component is the weighted sum of the standardized original variables
that captures as much of the variance in the data as possible.8 The standardization of the
original variables is done as follows. In the case of continuous variables, one subtracts
the mean and then divides by the standard deviation. In the case of ordinal categorical
variables, the standardization uses results of an ordered probit model. The weight that
each variable gets in these linear combinations is obtained by analyzing the correlation
structure in the data. The weights are shown in Table 6.
In the second step, the subindex value is obtained rescaling the FPC so that it ranges
from 0 to 1 to ease interpretation. A country with the best possible performance (no
inequality) is assigned the value 0 and a country with the worst possible performance
(highest inequality) the value 1. Hence, the subindex values of all countries are between 0
and 1. Using the score of the FPC the subindex is calculated using the following transfor-
mation. Country X corresponds to a country of interest, Country Worst corresponds to a









8 The proportion of explained variance by the ﬁrst principal component is 70% for Family code, 93% for
Civil liberties, 60% for Physical integrity and 87% for Ownership rights.
8Every subindex is intended to measure a different dimension of social institutions re-
latedtogenderinequality. Tocheckwhetherthesubindicesareempiricallynon-redundant,
so that they provide each additional information, we conduct an empirical analysis of the
statistical association between them. In the case of well-being measures, McGillivray
and White (1993) suggest using two explicit thresholds to separate redundancy from non-
redundancy, that is a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.90 and 0.70. Based on this suggestion we
use the threshold 0.80. In Table 7 we present Kendall tau b as a measure of the statistical
association between the ﬁve subindices. In all cases, the subindices are positively cor-
related, showing that they all measure social institutions related to gender inequality. It
must be noted, however, that the correlation is not always statistically signiﬁcant. Kendall
tau b is lower than 0.80 in all cases, which means that each subindex measures a distinct
aspect of social institutions related to gender inequality.
4 The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI)
With the subindices described in the last section as input, we build a multidimensional
composite index named Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) which reﬂects the
deprivation of women caused by social institutions related to gender inequality. The pro-
posed index is transparent and easy to understand. As in the case of the variables and of
the subindices, the index value 0 corresponds to no inequality and the value 1 to complete
inequality.
The SIGI is an unweighted average of a non-linear function of the subindices. We use
equal weights for the subindices, as we see no reason for valuing one of the dimensions
more or less than the others.9 The non-linear function arises because we assume that
inequality in gender-related social institutions leads to deprivation experienced by the af-
fected women, and that deprivation increases more than proportionally when inequality
increases. Thus, high inequality is penalized in every dimension. The non-linearity also
means that the SIGI does not allow for total compensation among subindices, but permits
partial compensation. Partial compensation implies that high inequality in one dimen-
sion, i.e. subindex, can only be partially compensated with low inequality on another
dimension.10
9 Empirically, even in the case of equal weights the ranking produced by a composite index is inﬂuenced
by the different variances of its components. The component that has the highest variance has the largest
inﬂuence on the composite index. In the case of the SIGI the variances of the ﬁve components are
reasonably close to each other, Ownership rights having the largest and Physical integrity having the
lowest variance.
10 Other approaches have been also proposed in the literature, e.g. the non-compensatory approach by



















(Subindex Ownership Rights)2 (3)
Using a more general notation, the formula for the SIGI I(X), where X is the vector
containing the values of the subindices xi with i = 1,...,n, is derived from the following
considerations. Forany subindexxi, we interpret thevalue0 as thegoal ofno inequalityto
be achieved in every dimension. We deﬁne a deprivation function f(xi,0), with f(xi,0) >
0 if xi > 0 and f(xi,0) = 0 if xi = 0 (e.g. Subramanian, 2007). Higher values of xi should
lead to a penalization in I(X) that should increase with the distance xi to zero. In our case
the deprivation function is the square of the distance to 0 so that deprivation increases
more than proportionally as inequality increases.



















The formula is inspired by the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures (Foster












whereY is the vectorcontainingall incomes, yi withi=1,...,nis the incomeofindividual
i, z is the poverty line, and a > 0 is a penalization parameter.
To compute the SIGI, the value 2 is chosen for a as the square function has the advan-
tage of easy interpretation. With a = 2 the transfer principle is satisﬁed (Foster et al.,
1984). In the context of poverty this principle means that a transfer from a person be-
low the poverty line to a person less poor will raise poverty if the set of poor remains
Munda and Nardo (2005a,b).
10unchanged. In the case of the SIGI, the transfer principle means that an increase in in-
equality in one dimension and a decrease of inequality in another dimension of the same
magnitude will raise the SIGI.
Some differences between the SIGI and the FGT measures must be highlighted. In the
case of the SIGI, we are aggregating across dimensions and not over individuals. More-
over, in contrast to the income case, a lower value of xi is preferred, and the normalization
achieved when dividing by the poverty line z is not necessary as 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, i = 1,...,n.
The SIGI fulﬁlls several properties. For a formal presentation of the properties and the
proofs, see Appendix 2.
• Support and range: The value of the index can be computed for any values of the
subindices, and it is always between 0 and 1.
• Anonymity: Neither the name of the country nor the name of the subindex have an
impact on the value of the index.
• Unanimity or Pareto Optimality: If a country has values for every subindex that are
lower than or equal to those of another country, then the index value for the ﬁrst
country is lower than or equal to the one for the second country.
• Monotonicity: If one country has a lower value for the index than a second country,
and a thirdcountry has the samevaluesfor thesubindicesas theﬁrst country, except
for one subindex which is lower, then the third country has a lower index value than
the second country.
• Penalization of dispersion: For two countries with the same average value of the
subindices, the country with the lowest dispersion of the subindices gets a lower
value for the index.
• Compensation: Although the SIGI is not conceived for changes over timethis prop-
erty is more intuitively understood in the following way. If a country experiences
an increase in inequality by a given amount on a subindex, then the country can
only have the same value of the index as before, if there is a decrease in inequality
on another subindex that is higher in absolute value than the increase.
To highlight the effects of partial compensation as compared to total compensation we
computed the statistical association between the SIGI and a simple arithmetic average of
the ﬁve subindices that allows for total compensation and compared the country rankings
11of both measures in Appendix 3.11 The Pearson correlation coefﬁcient between the SIGI
and the simple arithmetic average of the ﬁve subindices shows a high and statistically
signiﬁcant correlation between both measures (Table 8). However, when we compare
the ranks of the SIGI with those obtained using a simple arithmetic average of the ﬁve
subindices in Table 9, we observe that there are noticeable differences in the rankings of
the 102 included countries. Examples are China and Nepal. China ranks in position 55
using the simple average, but worsens to place 83 in the SIGI ranking. Nepal has place 84
considering the simple average, and improves to rank 65 using the SIGI. For China, this
is due to the high value on the subindex Son preference, which in the SIGI case cannot
be fully compensated with relatively low values for the other subindices. For Nepal we
observe the opposite case as all subindices have values reﬂecting moderate inequality.
5 Results
5.1 Country Rankings and Regional Patterns
In Appendix 4, the results for the SIGI and its ﬁve subindices are presented. Among
the 102 countries considered by the SIGI12 (Table 10) Paraguay, Croatia, Kazakhstan,
Argentina and Costa Rica have the lowest levels of gender inequality related to social
institutions. Sudan is the country that occupies the last position, followed by Afghanistan,
Sierra Leone, Mali and Yemen, which means that gender inequality in social institutions
is a major problem there.
Rankings according to the subindicesare as follows. ForFamilycode 112 countries can
be ranked. Best performers are China, Jamaica, Croatia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Worst
performers are Mali, Chad, Afghanistan, Mozambique and Zambia. In the dimension
Civil liberties 123 countries are ranked. Among them 83 share place 1 in the ranking.
Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Yemen and Iran occupy the last ﬁve positions of high
inequality. 114 countries can be compared with the subindex Physical Integrity. Hong
Kong, Bangladesh, Chinese Taipei, Ecuador, El Salvador, Paraguay and Philippines are
at the top of the ranking while Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt and Sierra Leone are at the
bottom. In the dimension Son preference 88 out of 123 countries rank at the top as they
11 We cannot compare the SIGI with the results of the non-compensatoryindex as proposed by Munda and
Nardo (2005a,b). The algorithm used for calculating non-compensatoryindices compares pairwise each
country for each subindex. However,as our dataset includes many countries with equal values on several
subindices, the numerical algorithm cannot provide a ranking.
12 The subindices are computedfor countries that have no missing values on the relevant input variables. In
the case of the SIGI only countries that have values for every subindex are considered.
12do not have problems with missing women. The countries that rank worst are China,
Afghanistan, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, India and Bhutan. Finally, 122 countries are
ranked with the subindex Ownership rights. 42 countries share position 1 as they have no
inequality in this dimension. On the other hand the four worst performing countries are
Sudan, Sierra Leone, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
To ﬁnd out whether apparent regional patterns in social institutions related to gender
inequality are systematic, we divide the countries in quintiles following the scores of the
SIGI and its subindices (Table 11 in Appendix 5). The ﬁrst quintile includes countries
with lowest inequality, and the ﬁfth quintile countries with highest inequality.
For the SIGI, no country of Europe and Central Asia (ECA) or Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC) is found in the two quintiles reﬂecting social institutions related to high
gender inequality. In contrast, most countries in South Asia (SA), Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA), and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) rank in these two quintiles. It is
interesting to note that in the most problematic regions two countries rank in the ﬁrst two
quintiles. These are Mauritius (SSA) and Tunisia (MENA). East Asia and Paciﬁc (EAP)
has countries in all ﬁve quintiles with Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong and Singapore
in the ﬁrst quintile and China in the ﬁfth quintile.
Going on with the subindices the patterns are similar to the one of the SIGI. As more
information is available for the subindices, the number of countries covered by every
subindex is different and higher than for the SIGI. In the following some interesting facts
are highlighted, especially countries whose scores are different than the average in the
region.
• Family code: No country in ECA, LAC or EAP shows high inequality. SA, MENA
and SSA remain problematic with countries with social institutions related to high
gender inequality. Exceptions are Bhutan in SA, Mauritius in SSA, and Tunisia and
Israel in MENA.
• Civil liberties: Only three groups of countries using the quintile analysis can be
generated with the ﬁrst group including the ﬁrst three quintiles. In SSA over one-
half of the countries are now in the ﬁrst group. Also in MENA there are some
countries with good scores (Israel, Morocco and Tunisia). No country in SA is
found in the ﬁrst three quintiles of low and moderate inequality.
• Physical integrity: Most problematic regions are SSA and MENA. Exceptions in
these regions are Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa and Tanzania (SSA), and Mo-
rocco and Tunisia (MENA).
13• Son preference: Again only three groups of countries can be built by quintile anal-
ysis, with the ﬁrst group including the ﬁrst three quintiles. As in the case of Civil
liberties most of the countries in SSA do not show problems. Missing women is
mainly an issue in SA and MENA. But in both regions there are countries that rank
in the ﬁrst group. These are Sri Lanka in SA, and Israel, Lebanon and Occupied
Palestinian Territory in MENA.
• Ownership rights: Most problematic regions are SA, SSA and MENA. Neverthe-
less, there are cases in these regions that rank in the ﬁrst quintile. These are Egypt,
Israel, KuwaitandTunisia(MENA),Bhutan(SA), and EritreaandMauritius(SSA).
5.2 Simple Correlation with other Gender-related Indices
The SIGI is an important measure to understand gender inequality as it measures insti-
tutions that inﬂuence the basic functioning of society and explain gender inequality in
outcomes. From this perspective, the SIGI has an added value to other gender-related
measures irrespective from an empirical redundancy perspective, i.e. whether it provides
additional information as compared to other measures.
Nevertheless, one can check whether the index is empirically redundant with an empir-
ical analysis of the statistical association between the SIGI and other well-known gender-
related indices. Relying on McGillivrayand White (1993) we use a correlation coefﬁcient
of 0.80 in absolute value as the threshold to separate redundancy from non-redundancy.
We calculated Pearson correlation coefﬁcient and Kendall tau b as a measure of rank
correlation between theSIGI and each ofthe followingindices: theGender-related Devel-
opmentIndex (GDI) and theGender EmpowermentMeasure(GEM) from United Nations
Development Programme (2006), the Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) from Hausmann,
Tyson, and Zahidi (2007) and the Women’s Social Rights Index.13 As the GDI and the
GEM have been criticized in the literature (e.g. Klasen, 2006; Schüler, 2006), we also
do the analysis for two alternative measures, the Gender Gap Index Capped (GGI) and
a revised Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM2) based on income shares proposed by
Klasen and Schüler (2009).14 For all the indices considered both measures of statistical
13 Data obtained from http://ciri.binghamton.edu/.
14 The Gender Gap Index Capped (GGI) is a geometric mean of the ratios of female to male achievements
in the dimensions health, education and labor force participation. Capped means that every component
is capped at one before calculating the geometric mean. This is necessary as a better relative perfor-
mance of women, e.g. in the dimension health can be due to a risky behavior of men that should not
be rewarded. GGI can be more directly interpreted as a measure of gender inequality while the GDI
measures human development penalizing gender inequality. The GEM has three components, political
representation, representation in senior positions in the economy, and power over economic resources.
14associationare lowerthan 0.80 in absolutevalueand statisticallysigniﬁcant. We conclude
that the SIGI is related to these gender measures but is non-redundant. These results as
well as the comparison of the country rankings of the SIGI and these other measures can
be found in Tables 12 and 13 (Appendix 6).
5.3 Regression Analysis
The SIGI is aimed to measure the institutional basis of gender inequality. To explore
whether the SIGI is associated with gender inequality in outcomes we use linear regres-
sions with two well-known measures as dependent variables and the SIGI as regressor.
The ﬁrst is the Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) that captures gaps in outcome variables
related to basic rights such as health, economic participation and political empowerment.
The second measure is the ratio of GDI to HDI as compositemeasure of gender inequality
in the dimensions health, education and income.15 In both regressions we control for the
level of economic development using the log of per capita GDP in constant prices (US$,
PPP, base year: 2005) (World Bank, 2008); for religion using a Muslim majority and a
Christian majority dummy, the left-out category being countries that have neither a major-
ity of Muslim nor a majority of Christian population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2009);
and for geography and other unexplainedheterogeneity that might go togetherwith region
using region dummies, the left-out category being Sub-Saharan Africa. As the number of
observations is lower than 100, we use HC3 robust standard errors proposed by Davidson
and MacKinnon (1993) to account for possible heteroscedasticity in our data.
TheregressionusingGGGasdependentvariableispresentedinTable??. Itincludes72
countries and the coefﬁcient of determination R2 is 0.66. the SIGI is negativelyassociated
with GGG and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The second regression with the ratio of GDI
to HDI as dependent variable is shown in Table ??. The sample consists of 78 countries
and R2 is 0.50. The SIGI is again negatively associated with the response variable and
this association is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The results suggest that gender
inequality in well-being and empowerment is strongly associated with social institutions
that shape gender roles.
Even if we include control variables in the regressions we cannot rule out omitted vari-
able bias, but as we consider that social institutions related to gender inequality are rela-
The most problematic component is power over economic resources proxied by earned incomes. This
component measures female and male earned incomes using income levels adjusted by gender gaps but
not the gender gaps themselves. The revised version GEM2 uses income shares of males and females.
15 As the GDI is not a measure of gender inequality, UNDP recommends using the ratio of GDI to HDI
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/gdi_gem/).
15tively stable and long-lasting, we consider that endogeneity does not pose a major prob-
lem. To check that our ﬁndings are not driven by observations that have large residuals
and/or high leverage, we also run robust regressions obtaining similar results.16
6 Conclusion
In this paper we present composite indices that offer a new way to approach gender in-
equality that has been neglected in the literature and by other gender measures that focus
mainly on well-being and agency. Instead of measuring gender inequality in education,
health, economic or political participation and other dimensions, the proposed measures
proxy the underlying social institutions that are mirrored by societal practices and legal
norms that might produce inequalities between women and men in developing countries.
Based on 12 variables of the OECD Gender, Institutions and Development (GID) Da-
tabase (Morrison and Jütting, 2005; Jütting et al., 2008) we construct ﬁve subindices
capturing each one dimension of social institutions related to gender inequality: Family
code, Civil liberties, Physical integrity, Son preference and Ownership rights. The Social
InstitutionsandGenderIndex(SIGI)combinesthesubindicestoamultidimensionalindex
of deprivation of women caused by social institutions related to gender inequality. With
these measures over 100 developing countries can be compared and ranked.
When constructing composite indices one is always confronted with decisions and
trade-offs concerning for example the choice and treatment of the variables included, the
weighting scheme and the aggregation method. We try to be transparent in our choices.
As the subindices are intended to proxy each one dimension of social institutions, we use
the method of polychoric PCA to extract the common element of the included variables
(Kolenikov and Angeles, 2009). The methodology for constructing the multidimensional
SIGI is based on the assumption that in each dimension deprivation of women increases
more than proportionally when inequality increases, and that each dimension should be
weighted equally. The formula of the SIGI is inspired by the FGT poverty measures (Fos-
ter et al., 1984) and has the advantage of penalizing high inequality in each dimension
and only allowing for partial compensation among the ﬁve dimensions. We consider that
the formula to compute the SIGI is easy to understand and to communicate.
16 Results are available upon request. The type of robust regression we perform uses iteratively reweighted
least squares and is described in Hamilton (1992). A regression is run with ordinary least squares, then
case weights based on absolute residuals are calculated, and a new regression is performed using these
weights. The iterations continue as long as the maximum change in weights remains above a speciﬁed
value.
16However, some limitations of the subindices and the SIGI must be noted. First, a com-
posite index depends on the quality of the data used as input. Social institutions related
to gender inequality are hard to measure and the work accomplished by the OECD build-
ing the GID database is an important step forward. It is worth to continue this endeavor
and invest more resources in the measurement of social institutions related to gender in-
equality. This includes data coverage, coding schemes and the reﬁnement of indicators.
It would be useful to exploit data available, for example from Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS)17 that speciﬁcally address the perception that women have of violence
against women, and to ﬁnance surveys in countries where data is not available.
Second, by aggregating variables and subindices, some information is inevitably lost.
Figures and rankings according to the SIGI and the subindices should not substitute a
careful investigation of the variables from the database. Furthermore, to understand the
situation in a given country additional qualitative information could be valuable.
Third, one should keep in mind that OECD countries are not included in our sample as
social institutions related to gender inequality in these countries are not well captured by
the 12 variables used for building the composite measures. This does not mean that this
phenomenon is not relevant for OECD countries, but that further research is required to
develop appropriate measures.
Nonetheless, the SIGI and its subindices offer a new perspective to understand gender
inequality. Empirical results show that the SIGI is statistically non-redundant and adds
new information to other well-known gender-related measures. The SIGI and the ﬁve
subindices can help policy-makers to detect in what developing countries and in which
dimensions of social institutions problems need to be addressed. For example, according
to the SIGI scores, regions with highest inequality are South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa,
and Middle East and North Africa. The composite measures can be valuable instruments
to generate public discussion. Moreover, the SIGI and its subindices have the potential
to inﬂuence current development thinking as they highlight social institutions that af-
fect overall development. As it is shown in the literature (e.g. Klasen, 2002; Klasen and
Lamanna, 2009) gender inequality in education negatively affects overall development.
Economic research investigating these outcome inequality should consider social institu-
tions related to gender inequality as possible explanatory factors. Results from regression
analysis show that the SIGI is related to gender inequality in well-being and empower-
ment, even after controlling for region, religion and the level of economic development.
17 Information is available on the webpage http://www.measuredhs.com/.
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21Appendix 1: Building the Subindices
Kendall tau and Weights from Polychoric PCA
Kendall tau b: Dimension Family Code
Table 1:
earmarr polyg parauth inher
earmarr Kendall tau b 1
Number of obs. 112
p-Value
polyg Kendall tau b 0.2950 1
Number of obs. 112 112
p-Value 0.0001
parauth Kendall tau b 0.2884 0.4792 1
Number of obs. 112 112 112
p-Value 0.0001 0.0000
inher Kendall tau b 0.234 0.5964 0.5742 1
Number of obs. 112 112 112 112
p-Value 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000
earmarr stands for the variable Early marriage, polyg for Polygamy, parauth is the variable Parental
authority and inher is the variable inheritance. For a description of these variables, see section 2.
The p-values correspond to the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent.
Kendall tau b: Dimension Civil Liberties
Table 2:
obliveil
freemov Kendall tau b 0.613
Number of obs. 123
p-Value 0.0000
freemov stands for the variable Freedom of movement. obliveil is the variable Obligation to wear
a veil in public. For a description of these variables, see section 2. The p-value correspond to the
null hypothesis that two variables are independent.
22Kendall tau b: Dimension Physical Integrity with Missing Women
Table 3:
femmut vio misswom
femmut Kendall tau b 1
Number of obs. 114
p-Value
vio Kendall tau b 0.1584 1
Number of obs. 114 114
p-Value 0.0382
misswom Kendall tau b -0.1041 0.1098 1
Number of obs. 114 114 114
p-Value 0.2160 0.1634
femmut stands for the variable Female Genital Mutilation, vio for Violence against women and
misswom is the variable Missing women. For a description of these variables, see section 2. The
p-values correspond to the null hypothesis that the two variables are independent.
Kendall tau b: Dimension Physical Integrity without Missing Women
Table 4:
vio
femmut Kendall tau b 0.1584
Number of obs. 114
p-Value 0.0382
femmut stands for the variable Female Genital Mutilation and vio for Violence against women.
For a description of these variables, see section 2. The p-value correspond to the null hypothesis
that two variables are independent.
23Kendall tau b: Dimension Ownership Rights
Table 5:
womland womloans womprop
womland Kendall tau b 1
Number of obs. 122
p-Value
womloans Kendall tau b 0.5943 1
Number of obs. 122 122
p-Value 0.0000
womprop Kendall tau b 0.6438 0.5975 1
Number of obs. 122 122 122
p-Value 0.0000 0.0000
womland stands for the variable Women’s access to land. womloans is the variable Women’s
access to loans and womprop is the variable Women’s access to property other than land. For a
description of these variables, see section 2. The p-values correspond to the null hypothesis that
the two variables are independent.









Freedom of movement 0.7071
Obligation to wear a veil 0.7071
Physical integrity
Female genital mutilation 0.7071
Violence against women 0.7071
Ownership rights
Woment’s access to land 0.5811
Woment’s access to loans 0.5665
Woment’s access to other property 0.5843
25Kendall tau b between Subindices
Table 7:
Family Civil Physical Son Ownership
code liberties integrity preference rights
Family code Kendall tau b 1
Number obs. 112
Civil liberties Kendall tau b 0.3844 1
Number obs. 112 123
p-value 0.0000
Physical integrity Kendall tau b 0.4367 0.2648 1
Number obs. 103 113 114
p-value 0.0000 0.0005
Son preference Kendall tau b 0.1603 0.4264 0.0272 1
Number obs. 112 122 114 123
p-value 0.0317 0.0000 0.7220
Ownership rights Kendall tau b 0.5484 0.3047 0.3937 0.1039 1
Number obs. 111 121 112 121 122
p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.181
26Appendix 2: Objectives, Properties and Proofs
In this section, we present the objectives and properties that we consider relevant for any com-
posite index related to social institutions related to gender inequality. Moreover, we show that the
proposed index fulﬁlls all of them.
We use the following notation. Let X j, with j = A,B, be the vector containing the the values of
the subindices x
j
i, with i = 1,...,n, for the country j18. I(X) represents the composite index.
Objectives of the Index
The objectives of the index are the following:
1. The index I(X) should represent the level of gender inequality, so that countries can be
ranked.
2. The interpretation of I(X) should be straightforward. As in the case of the subindices xi,
the value 0 should correspond to no inequality and the value 1 to complete inequality.
3. For any subindex xi, we interpret the value 0, i.e. no inequality, as the goal to be achieved.
The value zero can be thought of as a poverty line (see Ravallion, 1994; Deaton, 1997;
Subramanian, 2007, and references therein). We deﬁne a deprivation function f(xi,0), with
f(xi,0)>0 if xi >0, and f(xi,0)=0 if xi =0. Higher values of xi should lead to a penaliza-
tion in I(X) that should increase with the distance xi to zero, i.e.
¶I(X)





4. I(X) should not allow for total compensation among variables, but permit partial compen-
sation. This somehow relates to the transfer axioms that should be fulﬁlled by inequality as
well as poverty measures. A decrease in xi, i.e. less inequality, is rewarded more in I(X)
than an equivalent increase in another variable xk (see Atkinson, 1970; Kakwani, 1984;
Shorrocks and Foster, 1987; Subramanian, 2007; Alkire and Foster, 2008, and references
therein).
5. I(X) should be easy to compute and transparent.
Properties of the Index
Some of the properties that any index should fulﬁll are:
1. Support and range of I(X):
• I(X) must be deﬁned for 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, i = 1,...,n.
18 In what follows, the superscript j will only be used if it is necessary to distinguish countries.
27• 0 ≤ I(X) ≤ 1 must hold for any X.
• If xi = 0 ∀i, then I(X) = 0. If xi = 1 ∀i, then I(X) = 1.
2. Anonymity (symmetry): The value of I(X j) does not depend either on the names of the
subindices nor on the name of the country (j).
3. Unanimity (Pareto Optimality): If xA
i ≤ xB
i ∀i, then I(XA) ≤ I(XB).
4. Monotonicity: If considering XA and XB country A is preferred to country B, and only
xA
i improves (i.e. decreases) for a given i, while xB
i ∀i remains unchanged, then country A
should still be preferred over country B.
5. Penalization of inequality in the case of equal means: Let the mean of XA be equal
to the mean of XB. If the dispersion of XA is smaller than the dispersion of XB, then
I(XA) < I(XB).
6. Compensation property: In a two-variable example, △x1 ≤ 1−x1, and △x2 ≤ 1−x2.
a) If x1 increases by |△x1| and x2 decreases by |△x2| and |△x1|=|△x2|, then I(X) must
increase.
b) For I(X) to remain unchanged, we must have |△x2| > |△x1|.
Proofs








The index proposed fulﬁlls all the stated properties.
1. Support and range of I(X)
• I(X) is deﬁned for 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, i = 1,...,n.
• For any X, we have that 0 ≤ I(X) ≤ 1.
• If xi = 0 ∀i, then I(X) = 0. If xi = 1 ∀i, then I(X) = 1.
2. Anonymity (symmetry)
The value of I(X j) does not depend either on the names of the subindices nor on the name
of the country (j).
3. Unanimity (Pareto Optimality)




then we can show that
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Let us suppose, without loss of generality, that subindex x1 improves (decreases) by d > 0










































deﬁned as the vector corresponding to country A with only one variable having
improved (decreased) by d.
5. Penalization of inequality in the case of equal means
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In a two-variable example, let △x1 ≤ 1−x1, and △x2 ≤ 1−x2.






































and hence we have shown that if x1 increases by d and x2 decreases by d, then I(X)
must increase.
b) Let x1 = x2 = x > 0. We will show that if x1 increases by △x1 and x2 decreases by
30△x1 and the value of the index remains unchanged, the increase of x1 must be smaller




















Using the fact that x1 = x2 = x, we can rewrite this as
0 = 2x△x1+(△x1)2−2x△x2+(△x2)2
0 = 2x(△x1 −△x2)+(△x1)2+(△x2)2.
As 2x > 0, (△x1)2 > 0, and (△x2)2 > 0, we must have that
△x1−△x2 < 0
△x1 < △x2.
31Appendix 3: Comparison of SIGI with the Simple Average of the
Subindices






Comparison of the SIGI and the Simple Average of the Subindices
Table 9:
SIGI Simple Aver. Simple Aver. Rank
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value minus SIGI rank
Paraguay 1 0.0024832 2 0.0312943 1
Croatia 2 0.00333 1 0.0273771 -1
Kazakhstan 3 0.0034778 3 0.0314302 0
Argentina 4 0.0037899 4 0.0354832 0
Costa Rica 5 0.0070934 5 0.0502099 0
Russian Federation 6 0.0072524 11 0.0538114 5
Philippines 7 0.0078831 15 0.0603212 8
El Salvador 8 0.0082581 16 0.0647861 8
Ecuador 9 0.0091447 18 0.0700484 9
Ukraine 10 0.00969 6 0.051376 -4
Mauritius 11 0.009759 7 0.0521866 -4
Moldova 12 0.0098035 8 0.052673 -4
Bolivia 13 0.0098346 9 0.0529972 -4
Uruguay 14 0.0099167 10 0.0538078 -4
Venezuela, RB 15 0.0104259 13 0.0578608 -2
Thailand 16 0.010677 17 0.0652957 1
Peru 17 0.0121323 14 0.0586566 -3
Colombia 18 0.012727 24 0.0828911 6
Belarus 19 0.0133856 12 0.0563755 -7
Hong Kong, China 20 0.0146549 19 0.07076 -1
Singapore 21 0.0152573 20 0.0714613 -1
Continued on next page
32Table 9 – continued from previous page
SIGI Simple Aver. Simple Aver. Rank
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value minus SIGI rank
Cuba 22 0.0160304 22 0.0750193 0
Macedonia, FYR 23 0.0178696 23 0.0818509 0
Brazil 24 0.0188021 21 0.073534 -3
Tunisia 25 0.0190618 29 0.1012313 4
Chile 26 0.0195128 31 0.106534 5
Cambodia 27 0.0220188 27 0.0886198 0
Nicaragua 28 0.0225149 32 0.1117536 4
Trinidad and Tobago 29 0.0228815 34 0.1143368 5
Kyrgyz Republic 30 0.0292419 36 0.12716 6
Viet Nam 31 0.0300619 25 0.0837526 -6
Armenia 32 0.0301177 26 0.0845632 -6
Georgia 33 0.0306926 28 0.0902375 -5
Guatemala 34 0.0319271 35 0.124404 1
Tajikistan 35 0.0326237 37 0.137724 2
Honduras 36 0.0331625 33 0.1122453 -3
Azerbaijan 37 0.0339496 30 0.1058964 -7
Lao PDR 38 0.0357687 39 0.1416411 1
Mongolia 39 0.0391165 43 0.1680587 4
Dominican Republic 40 0.0398379 40 0.1440229 0
Myanmar 41 0.0462871 42 0.1553233 1
Jamaica 42 0.0484293 38 0.1399837 -4
Morocco 43 0.0534361 45 0.1973177 2
Fiji 44 0.0545044 41 0.1551223 -3
Sri Lanka 45 0.059141 47 0.2106919 2
Madagascar 46 0.0695815 44 0.1938462 -2
Namibia 47 0.0750237 49 0.241875 2
Botswana 48 0.0810172 46 0.2027736 -2
South Africa 49 0.0867689 53 0.2565411 4
Burundi 50 0.1069056 52 0.2488075 2
Albania 51 0.1071956 58 0.2715919 7
Senegal 52 0.1104056 50 0.2424129 -2
Tanzania 53 0.1124419 51 0.2445237 -2
Ghana 54 0.112694 54 0.2568415 0
Indonesia 55 0.1277609 57 0.2692867 2
Eritrea 56 0.1364469 48 0.2288967 -8
Kenya 57 0.1370416 56 0.2673039 -1
Cote d’Ivoire 58 0.1371181 59 0.2862332 1
Syrian Arab Republic 59 0.1381059 74 0.3619356 15
Malawi 60 0.1432271 65 0.330963 5
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Country Ranking Value Ranking Value minus SIGI rank
Mauritania 61 0.1497032 68 0.3336183 7
Swaziland 62 0.1565499 70 0.3456205 8
Burkina Faso 63 0.1616069 60 0.3030649 -3
Bhutan 64 0.162508 63 0.3196661 -1
Nepal 65 0.1672252 84 0.3973769 19
Rwanda 66 0.1685859 61 0.3059172 -5
Niger 67 0.1755873 72 0.3537308 5
Equatorial Guinea 68 0.1759719 76 0.3676708 8
Gambia, The 69 0.1782978 62 0.3177497 -7
Central African Republic 70 0.1843973 67 0.3323123 -3
Kuwait 71 0.1860213 79 0.3723096 8
Zimbabwe 72 0.1869958 78 0.3685864 6
Uganda 73 0.1871794 80 0.3735746 7
Benin 74 0.1889945 66 0.3319663 -8
Algeria 75 0.190244 87 0.4123239 12
Bahrain 76 0.1965476 89 0.4310629 13
Mozambique 77 0.1995442 82 0.3808849 5
Togo 78 0.202518 69 0.343517 -9
Congo, Dem. Rep. 79 0.2044817 64 0.3276955 -15
Papua New Guinea 80 0.2093579 83 0.3843125 3
Cameroon 81 0.2165121 85 0.4013174 4
Egypt, Arab Rep. 82 0.2176608 81 0.3779768 -1
China 83 0.2178559 55 0.2605644 -28
Gabon 84 0.2189224 86 0.4038617 2
Zambia 85 0.2193876 71 0.3526082 -14
Nigeria 86 0.2199123 92 0.4540078 6
Liberia 87 0.2265095 75 0.3629022 -12
Guinea 88 0.2280293 77 0.3678226 -11
Ethiopia 89 0.2332508 73 0.3559035 -16
Bangladesh 90 0.2446482 91 0.4491116 1
Libya 91 0.260187 94 0.5057952 3
United Arab Emirates 92 0.2657521 96 0.5082552 4
Iraq 93 0.2752427 97 0.522977 4
Pakistan 94 0.2832434 95 0.5062053 1
Iran, Islamic Rep. 95 0.3043608 98 0.5252544 3
India 96 0.318112 99 0.5295102 3
Chad 97 0.3225771 93 0.4733184 -4
Yemen 98 0.3270495 100 0.5567938 2
Mali 99 0.339493 88 0.422655 -11
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Country Ranking Value Ranking Value minus SIGI rank
Sierra Leone 100 0.3424468 90 0.4488637 -10
Afghanistan 101 0.5823044 101 0.746126 0
Sudan 102 0.6778067 102 0.800509 0
The data are sorted according to the value of the SIGI.
35Appendix 4: Rankings of Countries according to the SIGI and its Subindices
Ranking according to the SIGI and the Five Subindices
Table 10:
SIGI Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value
Paraguay 1 0.00248 19 0.06890 1 0 3 0.08757 1 0 1 0
Croatia 2 0.00333 3 0.00811 1 0 9 0.12878 1 0 1 0
Kazakhstan 3 0.00348 5 0.02837 1 0 9 0.12878 1 0 1 0
Argentina 4 0.00379 13 0.04864 1 0 9 0.12878 1 0 1 0
Costa Rica 5 0.00709 23 0.08106 1 0 15 0.16999 1 0 1 0
Russian Federation 6 0.00725 35 0.14028 1 0 9 0.12878 1 0 1 0
Philippines 7 0.00788 8 0.04053 1 0 3 0.08757 1 0 53 0.17351
El Salvador 8 0.00826 17 0.06485 1 0 3 0.08757 1 0 43 0.17151
Ecuador 9 0.00914 24 0.08917 1 0 3 0.08757 1 0 53 0.17351
Ukraine 10 0.00969 8 0.04053 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0
Mauritius 11 0.00976 11 0.04458 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0
Moldova 12 0.00980 12 0.04701 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0
Bolivia 13 0.00983 13 0.04864 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0
Uruguay 14 0.00992 15 0.05269 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0
Venezuela, RB 15 0.01043 21 0.07295 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0
Thailand 16 0.01068 41 0.15649 1 0 15 0.16999 1 0 1 0
Peru 17 0.01213 15 0.05269 1 0 33 0.24059 1 0 1 0
Colombia 18 0.01273 21 0.07295 1 0 15 0.16999 1 0 43 0.17151
Belarus 19 0.01339 4 0.02432 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0
Hong Kong, China 20 0.01465 26 0.10380 1 0 1 0 89 0.25 1 0
Singapore 21 0.01526 25 0.09975 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0
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Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value
Cuba 22 0.01603 28 0.11754 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0
Macedonia, FYR 23 0.01787 39 0.15169 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0
Brazil 24 0.01880 19 0.06890 1 0 48 0.29877 1 0 1 0
Tunisia 25 0.01906 32 0.12738 1 0 9 0.12878 89 0.25 1 0
Chile 26 0.01951 34 0.13909 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 56 0.17723
Cambodia 27 0.02202 38 0.14433 1 0 48 0.29877 1 0 1 0
Nicaragua 28 0.02251 33 0.12970 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 43 0.17151
Trinidad and Tobago 29 0.02288 39 0.15169 1 0 15 0.16999 89 0.25 1 0
Kyrgyz Republic 30 0.02924 42 0.15980 1 0 48 0.29877 1 0 56 0.17723
Viet Nam 31 0.03006 6 0.03242 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0
Armenia 32 0.03012 7 0.03648 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0
Georgia 33 0.03069 17 0.06485 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0
Guatemala 34 0.03193 27 0.10538 1 0 54 0.34513 1 0 43 0.17151
Tajikistan 35 0.03262 47 0.25955 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 43 0.17151
Honduras 36 0.03316 44 0.21610 1 0 54 0.34513 1 0 1 0
Azerbaijan 37 0.03395 37 0.14314 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0
Lao PDR 38 0.03577 51 0.32034 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 43 0.17151
Mongolia 39 0.03912 30 0.12001 1 0 48 0.29877 89 0.25 43 0.17151
Dominican Republic 40 0.03984 28 0.11754 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 58 0.34502
Myanmar 41 0.04629 35 0.14028 1 0 60 0.38634 89 0.25 1 0
Jamaica 42 0.04843 1 0.00405 1 0 54 0.34513 1 0 76 0.35074
Morocco 43 0.05344 48 0.26279 1 0 9 0.12878 89 0.25 58 0.34502
Fiji 44 0.05450 8 0.04053 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 66 0.34874
Sri Lanka 45 0.05914 46 0.23404 98 0.30069 15 0.16999 1 0 66 0.34874
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Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value
Madagascar 46 0.06958 70 0.41138 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 43 0.17151
Namibia 47 0.07502 58 0.35307 1 0 34 0.25756 89 0.25 66 0.34874
Botswana 48 0.08102 53 0.32163 1 0 15 0.16999 1 0 79 0.52225
South Africa 49 0.08677 73 0.42326 84 0.29808 23 0.21635 1 0 58 0.34502
Burundi 50 0.10691 57 0.33545 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 79 0.52225
Albania 51 0.10720 31 0.12288 1 0 60 0.38634 101 0.5 66 0.34874
Senegal 52 0.11041 99 0.60250 1 0 45 0.26455 1 0 58 0.34502
Tanzania 53 0.11244 81 0.49886 1 0 22 0.20151 1 0 79 0.52225
Ghana 54 0.11269 61 0.36621 1 0 80 0.39575 1 0 79 0.52225
Indonesia 55 0.12776 59 0.35405 103 0.59876 79 0.39362 1 0 1 0
Eritrea 56 0.13645 76 0.45538 1 0 106 0.68910 1 0 1 0
Kenya 57 0.13704 63 0.37027 1 0 46 0.28152 1 0 111 0.68473
Cote d’Ivoire 58 0.13712 79 0.49012 1 0 85 0.43455 1 0 77 0.50650
Syrian Arab Republic 59 0.13811 68 0.40269 98 0.30069 34 0.25756 101 0.5 66 0.34874
Malawi 60 0.14323 60 0.36087 84 0.29808 88 0.47362 1 0 79 0.52225
Mauritania 61 0.14970 71 0.42056 98 0.30069 103 0.60183 1 0 58 0.34502
Swaziland 62 0.15655 86 0.52144 84 0.29808 60 0.38634 1 0 79 0.52225
Burkina Faso 63 0.16161 88 0.53939 1 0 104 0.63092 1 0 58 0.34502
Bhutan 64 0.16251 43 0.20513 84 0.29808 54 0.34513 118 0.75 1 0
Nepal 65 0.16723 62 0.36779 84 0.29808 48 0.29877 101 0.5 79 0.52225
Rwanda 66 0.16859 56 0.32974 1 0 91 0.51512 1 0 111 0.68473
Niger 67 0.17559 104 0.64882 1 0 99 0.52482 89 0.25 58 0.34502
Equatorial Guinea 68 0.17597 82 0.50291 84 0.29808 91 0.51512 1 0 79 0.52225
Gambia, The 69 0.17830 103 0.64303 1 0 102 0.59698 1 0 66 0.34874
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SIGI Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value
Central African Republic 70 0.18440 92 0.55902 1 0 101 0.58029 1 0 79 0.52225
Kuwait 71 0.18602 83 0.50523 103 0.59876 34 0.25756 101 0.5 1 0
Zimbabwe 72 0.18700 80 0.49075 84 0.29808 59 0.36937 1 0 111 0.68473
Uganda 73 0.18718 102 0.63697 84 0.29808 81 0.41058 1 0 79 0.52225
Benin 74 0.18899 84 0.50633 1 0 87 0.46877 1 0 111 0.68473
Algeria 75 0.19024 69 0.40501 103 0.59876 60 0.38634 101 0.5 43 0.17151
Bahrain 76 0.19655 52 0.32147 103 0.59876 60 0.38634 101 0.5 66 0.34874
Mozambique 77 0.19954 109 0.69776 84 0.29808 60 0.38634 1 0 79 0.52225
Togo 78 0.20252 96 0.58833 1 0 86 0.44452 1 0 111 0.68473
Congo, Dem. Rep. 79 0.20448 66 0.39038 1 0 81 0.41058 1 0 119 0.83752
Papua New Guinea 80 0.20936 50 0.27697 1 0 60 0.38634 118 0.75 78 0.50825
Cameroon 81 0.21651 89 0.54344 84 0.29808 90 0.48332 1 0 109 0.68175
Egypt, Arab Rep. 82 0.21766 49 0.26647 98 0.30069 111 0.82273 101 0.5 1 0
China 83 0.21786 1 0.00405 1 0 48 0.29877 122 1 1 0
Gabon 84 0.21892 107 0.68387 84 0.29808 91 0.51512 1 0 79 0.52225
Zambia 85 0.21939 108 0.69197 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 111 0.68473
Nigeria 86 0.21991 71 0.42056 103 0.59876 89 0.47847 89 0.25 79 0.52225
Liberia 87 0.22651 87 0.53470 1 0 107 0.75756 1 0 79 0.52225
Guinea 88 0.22803 105 0.67140 1 0 105 0.64546 1 0 79 0.52225
Ethiopia 89 0.23325 55 0.32726 1 0 109 0.77424 1 0 108 0.67801
Bangladesh 90 0.24465 95 0.58334 103 0.59876 2 0.04121 101 0.5 79 0.52225
Libya 91 0.26019 67 0.39285 103 0.59876 91 0.51512 101 0.5 79 0.52225
United Arab Emirates 92 0.26575 93 0.56197 103 0.59876 100 0.53180 101 0.5 66 0.34874
Iraq 93 0.27524 77 0.47391 103 0.59876 98 0.51997 101 0.5 79 0.52225
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Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value
Pakistan 94 0.28324 64 0.37821 103 0.59876 47 0.28180 118 0.75 79 0.52225
Iran, Islamic Rep. 95 0.30436 91 0.55792 119 0.78099 91 0.51512 89 0.25 79 0.52225
India 96 0.31811 100 0.60655 103 0.59876 15 0.16999 118 0.75 79 0.52225
Chad 97 0.32258 111 0.79330 98 0.30069 84 0.43212 1 0 120 0.84049
Yemen 98 0.32705 97 0.59439 119 0.78099 60 0.38634 101 0.5 79 0.52225
Mali 99 0.33949 112 0.79735 1 0 114 0.97091 1 0 58 0.34502
Sierra Leone 100 0.34245 98 0.60159 1 0 110 0.79849 1 0 121 0.84424
Afghanistan 101 0.58230 110 0.71598 121 0.81777 91 0.51512 122 1 109 0.68175
Sudan 102 0.67781 106 0.67981 122 1 111 0.82273 101 0.5 122 1
Angola NA 89 0.54344 1 0 NA 89 0.25 79 0.52225
Bosnia and Herzegovina NA NA 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0
Chinese Taipei NA NA 1 0 3 0.08757 101 0.5 1 0
Congo, Rep. NA 101 0.62450 1 0 NA 1 0 79 0.52225
Guinea-Bissau NA NA NA 107 0.75756 1 0 111 0.68473
Haiti NA 65 0.37837 1 0 54 0.34513 1 0 NA
Israel NA 45 0.22712 1 0 NA 1 0 1 0
Jordan NA 85 0.51739 103 0.59876 NA 101 0.5 79 0.52225
Korea, Dem. Rep. NA NA 84 0.29808 91 0.51512 1 0 1 0
Lebanon NA NA 103 0.59876 60 0.38634 1 0 53 0.17351
Lesotho NA 94 0.57149 84 0.29808 NA 1 0 79 0.52225
Malaysia NA 53 0.32163 103 0.59876 NA 1 0 1 0
Occupied Palestinian Territory NA 78 0.48607 103 0.59876 NA 1 0 66 0.34874
Oman NA 74 0.45364 84 0.29808 NA 101 0.5 66 0.34874
Panama NA NA 1 0 8 0.11181 1 0 1 0
Continued on next page
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Puerto Rico NA NA 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 NA
Saudi Arabia NA 74 0.45364 122 1 NA 101 0.5 79 0.52225
Serbia and Montenegro NA NA 1 0 NA NA 43 0.17151
Somalia NA NA 103 0.59876 113 0.84213 1 0 111 0.68473
Timor-Leste NA NA 1 0 83 0.42755 89 0.25 79 0.52225
Turkmenistan NA NA 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 79 0.52225
Uzbekistan NA NA 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0
4
1Appendix 5: Regional Pattern of the Composite Index and Subindices
Table 11:
ECA LAC EAP SA SSA MENA Total
SIGI
Quintile 1 6 10 4 0 1 0 21
Quintile 2 6 8 5 0 0 1 20
Quintile 3 1 1 2 1 14 2 21
Quintile 4 0 0 1 2 13 4 20
Quintile 5 0 0 1 4 10 5 20
Total 13 19 13 7 38 12 102
Family Code
Quintile 1 7 11 4 0 1 0 23
Quintile 2 5 8 6 1 0 2 22
Quintile 3 1 1 4 3 9 5 23
Quintile 4 0 0 0 0 15 7 22
Quintile 5 0 0 0 3 16 3 22
Total 13 20 14 7 41 17 112
Civil Liberties
Quintile 1, 2, 3 17 22 14 0 27 3 83
Quintile 4 0 0 1 3 12 3 19
Quintile 5 0 0 2 4 3 12 21
Total 17 22 17 7 42 18 123
Physical Integrity
Quintile 1 5 13 5 3 4 2 32
Quintile 2 4 4 1 0 3 2 14
Quintile 3 7 5 7 3 6 4 32
Quintile 4 0 0 3 1 13 2 19
Quintile 5 0 0 0 0 14 3 17
Total 16 22 16 7 40 13 114
Missing Women
Quintile 1, 2, 3 15 21 10 1 38 3 88
Quintile 4 0 1 4 0 4 3 12
Quintile 5 1 0 3 6 1 12 23
Total 16 22 17 7 43 18 123
Ownership Rights
Quintile 1 12 12 11 1 2 4 42
Quintile 2 2 4 2 0 1 1 10
Quintile 3 2 3 2 1 8 7 23
Quintile 4 1 1 2 4 18 6 32
Quintile 5 0 0 0 1 14 0 15
Total 17 20 17 7 43 18 122
ECA stands for Europe and Central Asia, LAC for Latin America and the Caribbean, EAP for East Asia
and Paciﬁc, SSA for Sub-Saharan Africa, and MENA for Middle East and North Africa.
42Appendix 6: Comparison with other Gender-related Indices
Statistical Association between the SIGI and other Gender-related Measures
Table 12:
GDI Kendall tau b -0.501 Pearson Corr. Coeff. -0.5852
Number obs. 79 p-value 0.0000 p-value 0.0000
GGI (capped) Kendall tau b -0.5088 Pearson Corr. Coeff. -0.7169
Number obs. 85 p-value 0.0000 p-value 0.0000
GEM Kendall tau b -0.425 Pearson Corr. Coeff. -0.7024
Number obs. 33 p-value 0.0005 p-value 0.0000
GEM (revised) Kendall tau b -0.4402 Pearson Corr. Coeff. -0.7507
Number obs. 33 p-value 0.0003 p-value 0.0000
GGG Kendall tau b -0.4741 Pearson Corr. Coeff. -0.7295
Number obs. 73 p-value 0.0000 p-value 0.0000
WOSOC Kendall tau b -0.4861 Pearson Corr. Coeff. -0.5266
Number obs. 99 p-value 0.0000 p-value 0.0000
Data for the Gender-related development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)
are from United Nations Development Programme (2006) and are based on the year 2004. The Gender
Gap Index (GGI) capped and the revised Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM revised) are taken from
Klasen and Schüler (2009) based on the year 2004. Data for the Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) are from
Hausmann et al. (2007). The Women’s Social Rights Index (WOSOC) data correspond to the year 2007
and are obtained from http://ciri.binghamton.edu/. The p-values correspond to the null hypothesis
that the SIGI and the corresponding measure are independent.
43Comparison of Ranks: the SIGI and other Gender-related Indices
Table 13:
Country SIGI GDI GGI GEM GEM GGG WOSOC
(capped) (revised)
Paraguay 1 32 19
Croatia 2 6 16 6 7 3 19
Kazakhstan 3 18 1 10 19
Argentina 4 2 21 2 3 11 3
Costa Rica 5 7 40 3 2 8 3
Russian Federation 6 10 6 22 22 18 19
Philippines 7 22 30 10 8 1 19
El Salvador 8 29 35 13 14 20 19
Ecuador 9 14 11 17 19
Ukraine 10 19 7 23 23 25 19
Mauritius 11 12 46 44 3
Moldova 12
Bolivia 13 35 24 19 15 41 3
Uruguay 14 5 17 15 17 39 19
Venezuela, RB 15 17 23 11 13 24
Thailand 16 16 8 20 18 22 19
Peru 17 23 24 8 6 37 3
Colombia 18 15 11 16 16 7 3
Belarus 19 11 3 6 3
Hong Kong, China 20
Singapore 21 1 11 38 19
Cuba 22 37 5 1
Macedonia, FYR 23 13 32 9 9 13 19
Brazil 24 14 20 20 19 36 3
Tunisia 25 26 72 55 64
Chile 26 3 44 16 20 45 3
Cambodia 27 45 10 28 26 52 3
Nicaragua 28 37 56 49 19
Trinidad and Tobago 29 9 33 4 5 19 1
Kyrgyz Republic 30 34 11 33 19
Viet Nam 31 31 2 15 19
Armenia 32 20 4 34 19
Georgia 33 24 24 30 19
Guatemala 34 39 64 58 19
Tajikistan 35 40 19 40 19
Honduras 36 38 36 12 10 31 19
Azerbaijan 37 28 4 26 19
Continued on next page
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Country SIGI GDI GGI GEM GEM GGG WOSOC
(capped) (revised)
Lao PDR 38 47 45 3
Mongolia 39 36 27 25 25 27 3
Dominican Republic 40 25 38 29 19
Myanmar 41 14 64
Jamaica 42 30 18 14 3
Morocco 43 19
Fiji 44 3
Sri Lanka 45 24 51 29 28 2 19
Madagascar 46 53 15 48 19
Namibia 47 43 33 5 4 9 19
Botswana 48 46 59 18 21 23 64
South Africa 49 41 42 4 19
Burundi 50 72 24 64
Albania 51 19
Senegal 52 64
Tanzania 53 66 27 7 1 12 19
Ghana 54 48 27 28 19
Indonesia 55 32 39 42 19
Eritrea 56 19
Kenya 57 57 42 43 64
Cote d’Ivoire 58 68 80 64
Syrian Arab Republic 59 33 63 56 64
Malawi 60 70 41 46 19
Mauritania 61 60 48 60 64
Swaziland 62 59 82 64
Burkina Faso 63 76 50 66 64
Bhutan 64 3
Nepal 65 51 61 70 64
Rwanda 66 63 9 3
Niger 67 79 78 19
Equatorial Guinea 68 42 62 19
Gambia, The 69 50 19
Central African Republic 70 75 67 19
Kuwait 71 1 48 51 64
Zimbabwe 72 58 57 47 19
Uganda 73 54 31 21 19
Benin 74 67 73 69 64
Algeria 75 64
Bahrain 76 4 76 64 64
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Country SIGI GDI GGI GEM GEM GGG WOSOC
(capped) (revised)
Mozambique 77 71 47 16 64
Togo 78 61 70 64
Congo, Dem. Rep. 79 73 60 64
Papua New Guinea 80 50 22 19
Cameroon 81 55 54 65 64
Egypt, Arab Rep. 82 32 31 68 64
China 83 20 13 35 64
Gabon 84 64
Zambia 85 69 64 54 64
Nigeria 86 64 66 59 64
Liberia 87 68 19
Guinea 88 65 58 19
Ethiopia 89 62 64
Bangladesh 90 49 52 27 27 53 64
Libya 91 69 64
United Arab Emirates 92 8 74 30 32 57 64
Iraq 93 84 64
Pakistan 94 51 81 26 28 71 64
Iran, Islamic Rep. 95 27 54 31 30 67 64
India 96 44 77 63 19
Chad 97 74 75 72 64
Yemen 98 62 83 33 33 73 64
Mali 99 77 53 61 19
Sierra Leone 100 78 71 64
Afghanistan 101 85 19
Sudan 102 56 79 64
Number of obs. 102 79 85 33 33 73 99
Data for the Gender-related development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)
are from United Nations Development Programme (2006) and are based on the year 2004. The Gender
Gap Index (GGI) capped and the revised Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM revised) are taken from
Klasen and Schüler (2009) based on the year 2004. Data for the Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) are from
Hausmann et al. (2007). The Women’s Social Rights Index (WOSOC) data correspond to the year 2007
and are obtained from http://ciri.binghamton.edu/.
46Appendix 7: Results from Regression Analysis
Linear Regression with Dependent Variable Global Gender Gap Index 2007
























Number of obs. 73 79
Adjusted R2 0.617 0.438
Prob F 0.000 0.000
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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